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Reflections on the UK Tribunal Reform from a
Canadian Perspective
Lorne Sossin*
I have been following the United Kingdom reforms with interest, and in par-
ticular, the journey Lord Justice Carnwath has been pursuing with the Tribunal
community in the United Kingdom (UK). The establishment of a unified Tribunals
system arose out of a desire to bring tribunals more expressly under the umbrella of
the justice system in order to better serve parties coming before those tribunals. The
rationales for the UK reform were set out in a 2001 review conducted by Sir An-
drew Leggett — “Tribunals for Users — One system One Service”.1
The resulting legislation, The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement (TCE) Act
2007, created a “Tribunals Service” and a Senior President of Tribunals (presently
Lord Justice Carnwath). The legislation also put in place a flexible tribunals struc-
ture, which permitted tribunals outside the Ministry of Justice to transfer into the
new system, as well as allow new jurisdictions to be added. According to the Tribu-
nals Service, the primary objective in making these changes is to improve the Tri-
bunal Services provided to “customers” in the following ways: “making clear the
complete independence of the judiciary, and their decisions making, from govern-
ment; speeding up the delivery of justice; making processes easier for the public to
understand; and bringing together the expertise from each Tribunal.”2
I would like to offer a Canadian perspective on the UK tribunal reform, and to
do so in light of new legislation in Ontario, Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability,
Governance and Appointments Act, 2009.3 Until this legislation, and analogous leg-
islative initiatives in Alberta in 2008 and in B.C. in 2004, Canadian administrative
tribunals existed largely in isolation from one another. Each was created pursuant
to a legislative mandate, housed within a different ministry, and subject to disparate
approaches to staffing, budgeting and administration. Some have Chairs who were
also CEOs while others had separate Chairs and CEO. Some have full-time mem-
bers; others part-time members, and some both. The subject matter of these tribu-
nals could not be more disparate — as LeBel J. famously remarked in Blencoe v.
* Professor and Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 (August 16, 2001), available online: Review of Tribunals <http://www.tribunals-
review.org.uk/>.
2 Online: Tribunals Service <http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/tribunals/about/about.htm>.
3 S.O. 2009, c. 33, Sch. 5. I served on an advisory committee during the development of
the legislation. Also, while I am a Vice-Chair of HPARB/HSARB, my views are not
their views. I am grateful for discussions with several people regarding this new legis-
lation, including Raj Anand, Jamie Baxter, Ron Ellis, Doug Ewart, Michael Gottheil,
and Laverne Jacobs. Responsibility for all the perspectives in this comment remains, of
course, my own.
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British Columbia (Human Rights Commission):4
[N]ot all administrative bodies are the same. Indeed, this is an understate-
ment. At first glance, labour boards, police commissions, and milk control
boards may seem to have about as much in common as assembly lines,
cops, and cows! Administrative bodies do, of course, have some common
features, but the diversity of their powers, mandate and structure is such that
to apply particular standards from one context to another might well be en-
tirely inappropriate. Thus, inevitably, a court’s assessment of a particular
delay in a particular case before a particular administrative body has to de-
pend on a number of contextual analytic factors.5
Yet, from the standpoint of the parties coming before these varied tribunals for
adjudication, the issues are remarkably similar — the desire for fair, accessible, in-
dependent and high quality justice. Finding the balance between the necessary and
desirable diversity of tribunals on the one hand, and the necessary and desirable
commonality between all tribunals on the other, has animated most debates within
the administrative justice community over at least the past two decades.
In light of this tension, the goal of many for a long time has been to view
administrative justice as a “system” with systemic needs, in addition to simply an
aggregation of various separate tribunals.6 Canada’s administrative tribunals, for
the moment, are a far cry from an administrative justice system. They are first and
foremost divided by jurisdiction. Canada features federal tribunals, provincial and
territorial tribunals, as well as municipal and aboriginal tribunals. Within each ju-
risdiction, tribunals are further fragmented by statutory mandate and supervisory
ministry, by policy context and stakeholders, by inquisitorial and adversarial mod-
els, and by subject area expertise.
While fragmentation remains the norm, a shift in thinking about administrative
tribunals has been occurring in Canada, with more substantial changes, I believe,
on the horizon. In B.C., for example, the 2004 Administrative Tribunals Act ad-
vanced a more coherent approach to statutory standards of review across the whole
spectrum of provincial adjudicative tribunals.
In Ontario, the Liberal Government, first elected in 2003, set about rational-
izing compensation and creating remunerative categories across the sector; and es-
tablished uniform appointment procedures, such as a first appointment of two
years, followed by a possible renewal for a further three years and a final renewal
for a five-year term. The Ontario Government similarly made a commitment to
advertise all openings and for merit-based selection.
The new Ontario Act, among other changes, entrenches the commitment both
to merit-based appointments and to adjudicative independence. Beyond this, the
new Act sets out obligations on all tribunals to develop and disseminate specified
accountability documents, including service standards, conflict of interest and ethi-
4 (2000), 2000 SCC 44, 2000 CarswellBC 1860, 2000 CarswellBC 1861, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.).
5 Ibid. at para. 158.
6 See L. Sossin, “The Ambivalence of Administrative Justice in Canada: Does Canada
Need a Fourth Branch?” in Lamer: The Sacred Fire, D. Jutras and A. Dodek, eds.
(2009) 46 Sup Ct L Rev 51–75.
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cal conduct rules and a memorandum of understanding between the tribunal and
ministry setting out the roles and responsibilities of each in the administration of
the tribunal.
While arguably not its intent, by articulating a new series of shared obliga-
tions, the Act, in my view, contributes in a significant way to making the adminis-
trative justice system a reality. For example, once a shared template for codes of
conduct is mandated, a shared administrative model for investigating complaints
becomes possible, and I would suggest, necessary. Thus, a natural next step follow-
ing this Act in Ontario may well be an “administrative council” for peer adjudica-
tion of complaints into the ethical conduct of adjudicators and regulators.
The shared template for tribunals also highlights the need for shared education
and training across the administrative justice sector. Given the mix of part-time and
full-time members on the one hand, and the mix of legally trained and non-legally
trained on the other, providing some organizing principles for all adjudicators to
call their own is a key step both in enhancing the quality of decision-making and in
the development of an administrative justice system. For now, the patchwork of
organizations with a mandate to provide education tailored to adjudicators, like the
Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators (SOAR),7 struggle without govern-
ment funding or the capacity to meet the diverse needs of the sector. The lack of
capacity for educating adjudicators stands in stark contrast to the leadership Canada
has shown in judicial education through the development of the National Judicial
Institute (NJI).
The Ontario legislation not only suggests the need for shared training and edu-
cation, but also expressly contemplates tribunals clustered to provide other shared
benefits and efficiencies. The Act creates the legislative authority for the develop-
ment of what are referred to as “clusters”. Clusters bring together two or more
tribunals into a shared administrative and governance structure. Clusters differ from
amalgamations and mergers of tribunals (with which Ontario also has some experi-
ence), in that clusters seek to gain benefits and efficiencies of collaboration
(through co-location and shared payroll, for example) without losing the diversity
and distinctiveness of individual tribunals.
Ontario’s first cluster — the Environmental and Land Tribunals of Ontario
(ELTO), which includes the Ontario Municipal Board, the Assessment Review
Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal and Conservation Authority — is
headed by an Executive Chair (a new statutory position), with the incumbent Chairs
of each tribunal becoming Associate Chairs. In August of 2010, a second cluster
was announced, consisting of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the Child and
Family Services Review Board, the Custody Review Board, the Social Benefits
Tribunal, Social Assistance Review Board, Special Education Tribunals (English
and French), and the Landlord and Tenant Board.
Tribunal clusters are not defined in the Act and the concept within administra-
tive law is a flexible one. The New Zealand Law Commission undertook a study of
clustering tribunals and attempted to develop the following functional definition for
7 In November of 2010, SOAR and Osgoode Hall Law School announced a partnership
with the goal of collaborating to expand the reach of adjudicative education throughout
the tribunal and regulatory sector.
20   CDN. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [24 C.J.A.L.P.]
clustering:8
We should also emphasize that there is no abstract definition of the concept
of a cluster. The idea of a cluster does not compel any particular level of
integration or sharing of services . . . Rather, the cluster model can be de-
signed in a nuanced way, reflecting the level of connectedness that is de-
sired for each different cluster. We stress too that the extent of connection
need not be the same for each cluster within the reform. There may, for
example, be one cluster where the tribunals are closely connected in terms
of common membership and procedures. This cluster may even merge some
of the individual tribunals’ jurisdictions. On the other hand, another cluster
could be a far looser grouping, with individual tribunals maintaining their
own identities, sharing fewer members and having greater procedural vari-
ance among themselves.
The very idea of a cluster is grounded in the separate legal identities of the
individual tribunals that make up the group. Contrasted with a growing interna-
tional trend toward tribunal amalgamation at the national and sub-national levels,9
we can say that clusters may be designed to produce some of the same procedural
outcomes as a unified tribunal service of the kind pursued in the UK, but that they
are not necessarily motivated by a desire to work each element into an increasingly
homogenous whole. A key consequence of this approach is that at least part of a
tribunal cluster’s purpose is to carry over the best practices and the substantive
knowledge and expertise of its constituent tribunals as the basis for coherent
change across the entire cluster.10
While a cluster usually is based on shared expertise, a unified tribunal service
of the kind pioneered by the UK combines tribunals that share little in the way of
common expertise. The U.K. Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 estab-
lished a generic First-tier tribunal with jurisdiction over a wide range of subject
areas previously dealt with under separate tribunals with separate legislative au-
thority. An Upper Tribunal was also established under this Act to deal with appeals
from the First-tier tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal is currently divided into six
chambers:
• General Regulatory Chamber;
• Social Entitlement Chamber;
• Health, Education and Social Care Chamber;
• War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation Chamber;
• Tax Chamber; and
• The Immigration and Asylum Chamber.
8 Law Commission of New Zealand, Tribunal Reform (Wellington: 2008) at 54-55. In its
most recent report of October 2008, the Law Commission explores several models for
reform and makes some initial recommendations as to its preferred option of a unified
tribunal service.
9 Rachel Bacon, “Amalgamating Tribunals: A Recipe for Optimal Reform” (Ph.D. The-
sis, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, April 2004) at 51.
10 See Robin Creyke, Tribunals in the Common Law World (Sydney: Federation Press,
2008) at 198.
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What remains a puzzle, and a key one for this discussion, is whether the On-
tario approach is a step along the way to a UK-style Tribunal Service, or whether
the UK Tribunal Service “chambers” will result, ultimately, in subject area cluster-
ing of a kind closer to the Ontario model.
Some clues may be derived from the 1989 UK report on “Enforcing Planning
Control”, in which Robert Carnwath argued for combining the fragmented aspects
of “environmental protection” in a single review body, and observed the value of
integrating these into the same system that reviews planning decisions.11 It is par-
ticularly interesting to note that Carnwath focused on the need for better enforce-
ment of environmental laws as they applied in cases primarily concerned with land
use planning. Emphasized much less, if at all, was the development of coherent and
comprehensive jurisprudence cross-fertilized by perspectives from land and envi-
ronment areas.12
It is worth noting that while the precise nature and scope of tribunal clusters in
Ontario remains a work in progress, clusters suggest a clear (and, I believe, inexo-
rable) progression toward integration and away from isolation. As clusters cut
across ministries, it will seem only natural that tribunals should be defined accord-
ing to their connection with administrative justice, and not their connection to a
particular ministry or minister. As in the UK, the logic of a single ministerial um-
brella extending across the tribunal sector as a whole may be inescapable. The UK
Tribunals Service may or may not be the destination of reform in that jurisdiction,
but the Ontario clusters are almost certainly just a stop on a longer journey for
Canadian administrative justice.
In short, this Act ultimately may be more notable for what it makes possible
than for what it achieves. 
11 Robert Carnwath, Enforcing Planning Control (London: H.M.S.O., 1989).
12 Ibid., quoted in Sir Henry Woolfe, “Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?”
(1992) 4 J Envtl L 1 at 12.
